## STATE OF VERMONT BENNINGTON COUNTY, SS.

STATE OF VERMONT	)	VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
	)	BENNINGTON UNIT
vs.	)	CRIMINAL DIVISION
	)	
CHRISTIAN JAMES,	)	<b>DOCKET NO. 981-10-17</b>
Defendant.	)	

### MOTION TO RECONSIDER SENTENCE

NOW COMES Christian James, Defendant, by and through his counsel, Chris J.

Montgomery, Esq., pursuant to 13 V.S.A. Se. 7042(a) and V.R.Cr.P. Rule 35, requests this

Court reconsider Defendant's sentence. In support of said Motion, Defendant states as

follows:

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A contested sentencing hearing was held on January 17, 2019 for the charge of DUI with death resulting. Defendant submitted, on his behalf, multiple statements from friends and family attesting to his good character, his own statement included in the PSI report, his lack of criminal record and a Sentencing Memorandum. At hearing, the State presented large photographs of the victim, as well as oral statements by family members attesting to the grief and anger over their loss. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to four years to eight years to serve. Among the factors considered by the Court in its decision were the following:

- 1. Defendant's BAC level at the time of the crash was .39;
- 2. General deterrence to the public was a major factor in sentencing;
- 3. The sentence was weighed against a sentence at the low end for some one with a low test, or someone who gets in a car with someone they know is intoxicated.

(Partial Sentencing Transcript pp. 24 to 28)

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#### STATEMENT OF LAW

A Court has wide discretion to consider all factors it believes are relevant in reconsideration of a sentence on V.R.Cr.P 35, *State v. Dean*, 148 Vt. 510 (1987). In considering alteration or reduction of a sentence, the Court should consider those factors present at the time the sentence was originally imposed. *State v. Richardson*, 161 Vt. 613 (1994). The purpose of reconsideration of a sentence is to permit the trial judge to reconsider its sentencing decision, absent the heat or passions of trial or sentencing pressures and in calm reflection, and to determine the sentence is correct, fair and serves the ends of justice. *State v. LaPine*, 148 Vt 14 (1987); *State v. Allen*, 145 Vt. 393 (1985); *State v. Therrien*, 140 Vt. 625 (1982).

In considering Defendant's BAC level at the time of the crash, the Court incorrectly believed he had an alcohol level of .390. (Partial Sentencing transcript pg. 26). The Court placed substantial weight on Defendant's BAC finding it "extraordinarily high" and,

"for all judgment and all sense and all ability to control his actions on – his motor skills by being able to operate a motor vehicle are completely gone as well as control his judgment by behind – the fact that he even got behind the wheel. And that deserves punishment clearly"

(Partial Sentencing Transcript pg. 26)

At the close of the determination of the appropriate sentence, the Court again alluded to the high BAC result stating, "I mean, anyone who has that type of test and they're – it's just a matter of time between – before either their going to hurt themselves or hurt someone else."

(Partial Sentencing Transcript pg. 27)

Defendant's actual BAC content was .239. Though well above the legal limit, it is considerably less than the .39 cited by the Court.

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The Court also considered, as an aggravating factor, the state of mind of the decedent in the seconds prior to the accident. In weighing this factor, the Court did not consider that the decedent's BAC at the time of the accident was .183, more than twice the legal limit. The Court weighed against Defendant the "pre-impact fear" suffered by the decedent, speculating that the decedent would have noticed the oncoming car in his lane and braked to stop. (Partial Sentencing Transcript pg. 26)

The evidence is far from clear what decedent was doing prior to the collision. His speed limit was based on the crash investigator's estimation, based upon mathematical calculations, concerning the speed and direction of the vehicles pre and post impact.

However, the crash investigator was only able to obtain data from Defendant's computer recorder located in his airbag module. Thus, he could determine Defendant's speed, steering, braking and direction within five seconds of impact. The same could not be provided for decedent's vehicle as it did not have an airbag recorder that could be downloaded. As a result, it is unknown as to his vehicle's actions in the seconds prior to the crash. Considering the decedent's own BAC level, it is no less possible that he may have just swerved back into his lane, been stopped or otherwise operating in a manner below that of an unimpaired driver.

Another factor the Court weighed against a lesser minimum sentence was the fact that decedent was not in the same place as someone who chose to get in a car with someone they knew to be intoxicated. In considering this factor, the Court again failed to consider that decedent had himself chosen to get behind the wheel of a car when he had a BAC of .183. This does not justify or in any sense diminish the tragic loss of life but should have been considered when determining the severity of Defendant's punishment.

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The sentencing hearing was highly charged and emotional. The State presented photographs and testimony of family members clearly distraught over the loss of a loved one and harboring great anger toward Defendant. Such sentencing hearings carry with them the risk of a sentence unduly influenced by the heat of the moment and passions of those present. It is not unusual for a sentence in a case such as this, oriented to the testimony and presentation of the State's witnesses, to be influenced by the emotions of the moment.

While the Court in its decision recognized a need for general deterrence, it did not adequately balance such need with the specific need for deterrence and rehabilitation of Defendant. 13 V.S.A §7030 of Vermont Statutes specifically provides that in any sentencing determination:

"...the court shall consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, the history and character of the defendant, the need for treatment, and the risk to self, others, and the community at large presented by the defendant."

Here, as the Court noted, Defendant had no prior history of criminal convictions and that his character, as supported by his many letters and the Pre-sentence Investigation Report, was not in question. Further, Defendant had lived in the community for 15 months without a violation of his conditions, with daily evidence of sobriety by his police check-in condition, continuing counseling and gainful employment. The risk of supervision in the community would be extremely low, while the need for treatment would be the priority, after a reasonable period of incarceration. The sentence imposed by the Court does not reflect these factors as it fails to consider Defendant's eligibility for probation, ability to live in the community at low risk to others, and the need for any treatment. Under the imposed sentence, Defendant would not be eligible for any programming for at least three years.

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When weighing all the evidence before the Court, as corrected above, and with calm reflection and outside the heat and passion of the sentencing hearing, a split sentence or sentence to serve with a lower minimum is appropriate in that it more fairly balances the character, risk and needs of the Defendant with the serious nature of the crime. For these reasons, Defendant requests this Court reconsider the sentence imposed and impose a sentence of 2 to 8 years to serve or a split sentence of 4 to 8 years, with 2 years to serve.

Dated: <u>3/7/2019</u>

BARR, STERNBERG, MOSS, SILVER & MUNSON, P.Q.

Chris Montgonery, Esq.

for Defendant, Christian James

cc: Alex Burke, Esq.

BarrSternberg Moss Silver & Munson, PC

1		SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL DIVISION
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3 4	STATE OF VERMONT, Plaintiff,	) Case No. 981-10-17 Bncr
5	-against-	) Bennington, Vermont )
6	CHRISTIAN JAMES,  Defendant.	) January 17, 2019 ) 3:08 PM ) _)
8 9		CHANGE OF PLEA
LO		LE WILLIAM D. COHEN, COURT JUDGE
11	APPEARANCES:	
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14 15	CHRISTOPHER MONTGOMERY, ESQ. Attorney for the Defendant	
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(Proceedings convened at 3:08 PM)

# STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. ALEXANDER BURKE: Your Honor, these type of cases, DUI fatal cases, are some of the hardest cases to sentence in this court. And --

THE COURT: Mr. Burke, every case is a hard case to sentence.

MR. BURKE: It is. And this is no exception. The defendant clearly did not intend to kill Jason Baumes. But he did engage in a series of actions that resulted in Jason's death. Our Supreme Court has identified four generally accepted goals of sentencing being punishment, prevention, rehabilitation, deterrence. And it also identified several others being restraint, education, and retribution.

THE COURT: Without specific priority.

MR. BURKE: With no specific priority, Your Honor.

And the Supreme Court has indicated one goal can outweigh another goal and some goals can be disregarded in a particular set of circumstances.

In this case, the defendant chose to engage in consuming alcohol, and when confronted by his friend whether he would be driving home, he indicated he would be walking, and then chose to get behind the wheel. The Defendant does have no prior criminal record, but he does have a prior history with alcohol and specifically alcohol abuse.



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In the PSI, it does indicate that he identified having problems with alcohol while he was in college and that his priest was concerned with his depression, that he was using alcohol to self-medicate. Because of that he withdrew from college to address his drinking and went to rehab in South Florida for a ninety-day stay. Apparently, successfully completed that and maintained sobriety for several years. And then he chose to start consuming alcohol again. Those are some aggravating factors for the State.

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Mitigating factors are the fact that the defendant does have no prior criminal record and he does appear to be remorseful for his actions. I cannot emphasize enough the impact this has had on Jason's family and I'm not going to go over again what they said because the Court said it better than I could ever say. But in this type of case there must be significant punishment for the death of somebody, the death of a son and a brother, and the punishment must be significant.

We cannot weigh the scales of one life versus another. But in this case we have to. On one side we have Jason who is no longer with us. On the other side we have Mr. James who caused his death, young man, limited record, no record, but made a series of bad choices, conscious choices. There must be a punishment for that effect. There must be a significant punishment for the loss of Jason.

A sentence of five to ten years does contain that



punishment. It also encompasses the goal of prevention. It keeps him out of the community for five years. As for the goal of rehabilitation, in the State's view, that should not be high on the Court's priority at this point. Mr. James had his opportunity to rehabilitate himself when he went to rehab and maintain his sobriety. He chose not to.

The family spoke significantly about the need to send a message to the community. They didn't say specifically deterrence; that is what they are referencing.

THE COURT: General deterrence.

MR. BURKE: General deterrence. The message that if you drive drunk and kill somebody, you go to jail for a long period of time. That is an appropriate response in this type of situation. And a sentence of eighteen months is not a significant deterrence. I would not call it a slap on the wrist, but it is not significant and there needs to be a significant deterrence to hopefully prevent another tragedy like this.

There's no right answer to what the appropriate sentence should be in this case.

THE COURT: So the legislature has enacted a mandatory minimum of one year --

MR. BURKE: Right.

THE COURT: -- with a maximum of fifteen years, which is a very significant range in how to appropriately sentence

someone without an enhancement, the enhancement being the fatality.

MR. BURKE: Correct.

THE COURT: But not an enhancement from a prior -- so that's -- we are looking at a wide range of options, one year on the low, fifteen years on the high. It does not allow the specific guide as to what factors would go into an appropriate sentence structure that allows a trial judge to make a reasonable and appropriate decision based on a multitude of factors.

MR. BURKE: Yes, Your Honor. And in this case, the factors mitigating against a lesser sentence is the level of alcohol in his system. He had a BAC of .239. He was asked whether he was walking home and he said yes, and then chose to drive. He had his options not to get behind the wheel and he chose to do so. He knew he had a problem with alcohol in the past and then chose to start drinking again. All those actions led to the death of Jason Baumes. If this was a case where the BAC was .08, slip of the mindset, and a -- no other record, no issue of alcohol abuse, that could be one where the legislature intended the lesser punishment.

But in this case, he --

THE COURT: But why though? There's still a death.

MR. BURKE: It is still a death, and the legislature has recognized that with the mandatory minimum of one year.



And we can't weigh one death with another death. I'm not 1 2 saving we do. We can't weigh one case against another THE COURT: 3 Every case is different. 4 case. Correct. MR. BURKE: 5 There's no -- there's no similarity THE COURT: 6 between any cases involving a DUI with a DUI fatality. 7 I would agree. And --MR. BURKE: 8 THE COURT: Obviously somebody with multiple offenses 9 would be dealt with on a much higher end. 10 Correct. MR. BURKE: 11 THE COURT: But not under this statute. This statute 12 is for first offenders, one to fifteen. 13 The legislature has not enhanced MR. BURKE: Right. 14 DUI fatal second offense or DUI fatal third offense. 1.5 simply DUI fatal and has a range of one to fifteen. 16 Given his -- what the data showed on September 24th, 17 his speed he was going at, the fact that he went into the 18 incoming traffic and did not brake, are all aggravating 19 factors that deserve a higher response, both for the 20 punishment as well as the prevention. 21 THE COURT: Is the pre-impact fear, which is obvious 22 from the facts of the case, that he was aware of the 23 circumstances involving the car coming in his lane, should 24

that be factored in?

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MR. BURKE: I think everything from that night should be factored in, Your Honor, including Mr. Baumes. And we will never know what he was thinking, but we do have a statement from his sister, Eileen, who was in a similar situation and --

THE COURT: No. We have the facts of the case. He slowed to either stop or to -- a few miles an hour based on the vehicle being in his lane.

MR. BURKE: Yes. So he knew there was an impact coming and unfortunately he could not prevent it. So, yes, I do believe that Court can consider that factor in its sentence. Given the specific impact this has had on the family and the history of the defendant, I do believe that a significant sentence to serve is appropriate to reach all of the goals of punishment and that five to ten is that appropriate sentence.

THE COURT: Based heavily on the punishment and general deterrence versus rehabilitation and specific deterrence?

MR. BURKE: Correct. I -- specific deterrence may play some role, but even just given the statement that the defendant gave in the PSI, he will have to live with this for the rest of his life. I'm sure he'll think about it for the rest of his life. That does not mean that there should not be a significant response from the Court.

THE COURT: Again, I don't think there's any case



Mahady, said every defendant is like a snowflake. They're all different and every sentence structure is different because of so many different variables that go into what occurs, the circumstances and the like. But looking at other DUI fatals within the State of Vermont, where does this fit a sentence structure that would pacify the State, fit within others?

MR. BURKE: I believe it is within the norm, if there is such a thing. Looking at just north of us, that wasn't charged as a DUI fatal, but the Sullivan case --

THE COURT: Four to ten years.

MR. BURKE: Yes.

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THE COURT: That was a hit and run.

MR. BURKE: That was a hit and run. But that individual had no prior record and had a very (ph.) social life prior to that. In this case we have an individual who has no criminal record and a very social life prior to this offense. So it is within the norm, if you will.

THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, according to the information, never took responsibility for the --

MR. BURKE: He did not, but I do not know if the Court took that into account in its determination of the sentence. But I'm not familiar enough with the specific sentencing hearing at that -- for the sentencing decision. I'm not the judge to say one way or the other.



1 THE COURT: Well, it had to be re-sentenced. 2 MR. BURKE: Right. But that was an issue for -- the judge declined a request to continue the hearing for the 3 expert testimony to come in, I believe. 4 5 THE COURT: Right. But I still think that there -in the end went to trial. 6 7 MR. BURKE: Correct. 8 THE COURT: They did go to trial. 9 MR. BURKE: They did go to trial. But we do not punish people with higher sentences by -- when they go to 10 11 trial. 12 THE COURT: We do not. Clearly. Thank you. 13 Mr. Montgomery? 14 DEFENDANT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 15 MR. CHRISTOPHER MONTGOMERY: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 Just to address the last issue raised by the Court, a review of sentences that have been handed down, I'm looking at 17 18 gross negligent operation as well as DUI, as they both carry 19 the one- to fifteen-year sentence. But the numbers seem to be 20 all over the place, which proves the Court's finding that every case is different. There is no cookie-cutter type case. 21 22 Every situation seems to be unique, both as to the defendant and as to the incident. They range from deferreds 23 to straight incarceration. The range of incarceration has 24



been from one year in docket 58-1-14 in Franklin County to

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five, whereas the max I saw was 74-2-13 in Orleans County, six years to fifteen. Now, I don't have the facts underlying any of those, other than they include people with priors, people who did hit and runs, people who engaged in such actions where there was clearly a severe warning as to their behavior prior to that incident or what was going on.

THE COURT: But that goes to what I was asking Mr. Burke about. There's no guide to this.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Yeah. There really isn't.

THE COURT: There's no special formula that you can plug in and say because of x, y, and z, the sentence should be --

MR. MONTGOMERY: No, Your Honor. And each case must be taken on its individual merits. And I would ask that this -- that the Court consider the individual merits of Mr. James in this case, and of course the statute which provides the guidelines for sentencing and I'm referring to 13 V.S.A. Section 730 (sic): the nature and circumstances of the crime, the history and character of defendant, the need for treatment, risk to self, others in the community at large presented by the defendant, as well as the guidelines which Mr. Burke has pointed out, the need for punishment, for deterrence, both specific and general, for rehabilitation.

We know on September 23rd -- before September 23rd, 2017, Mr. James was working as an employee at the Equinox



Hotel. He'd been working there for several months, had developed friendships there. He lived in Manchester Village with his family who lives there part time from New Jersey. His family and friends are present, as you can see, and they have submitted letters that were attached to the sentencing memorandum as well as attached to the PSI.

At --

THE COURT: I reviewed the letters that were -
MR. MONTGOMERY: They lay out -- and I point that out
just to lay out the background that he was raised as a person
who is caring, who is loving. It's not just that he has no
criminal record, but he's always lived a law-abiding life.

Mr. Burke is correct, there was a time when he was in college
where, through issues, he attended rehabilitation. And he
remained clean and sober and out of trouble for many years -for years.

He, on September 23rd, goes to Mulligan's with friends, it's karaoke night. We -- Mr. James cannot state and could not state because he has no memory of the events. He was, I believe, in a coma, either induced or by self because of the injuries until Wednesday after the date of this incident. That was at least three days. He does not -- he remembers working at the Equinox and that's it. It is the interviews with the people who were with him to which Mr. Burke is relying upon and from which make the basis of the

affidavit. He goes after work to Mulligan's. He stays there until about 2 a.m. About 2:15 is when this -- when the collision occurs.

The blood alcohol level indicates, and as Mr. James pointed out correctly, he had no alcohol at home and did not go anywhere else before Mulligan's or -- yeah, before Mulligan's and then after Mulligan's. He was served an inordinate amount of alcohol. But the law requires he is responsible for accepting that service. Mulligan's has to answer for its own liability in serving someone so much alcohol that they would reach a .239, but the law requires --

THE COURT: That's a similar issue. That's a civil case involving dram shop liability, which I'm --

MR. MONTGOMERY: Exactly. The law still requires he's responsible for consuming the alcohol, regardless of what Mulligan's may have done wrongfully or rightfully. And he accepts that.

The amount of alcohol, as the Court knows, and as pointed out, there are so many of these DUI accidents, both fatal and nonfatal because one of the first thing that happens when people consume alcohol is judgement goes out the window. And the impairment becomes higher with the more alcohol consumed.

We cannot presume -- I would argue the Court not to presume that Mr. James, and I know nobody's accusing him of

consciously and knowingly soberly getting into his car with any intent of harming anybody. By everything in the PSI, everything we know about Mr. James, he wouldn't hurt a flea. And on this day, he got behind the wheel, he crossed the line, what we know from all the data and the reconstruction of the accident. It does not appear that Mr. Baumes did anything We don't know why he was driving so slow or why he was wrong. stuck. We can presume he may have seen the oncoming car and attempted to brake, but we don't know. We know that he also had a blood alcohol level, but there is nothing that indicated that Mr. Baumes in any way contributed to the accident. He didn't cross into Mr. James' lane. Mr. James crossed into And Mr. James was driving at a speed somewhere between his. 68 and 70 by the black box.

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THE COURT: It's an undisputed fact, as indicated by Mr. James, that his alcohol consumption was -- caused the accident and caused the fatality.

MR. MONTGOMERY: That's correct. We --

THE COURT: And that's an important component to the case.

MR. MONTGOMERY: And impaired his ability to stay in his lane and to operate his vehicle in a safe manner. No doubt about that. There's no dispute there.

In looking at punishment, the statute -- the legislature makes a range of one to fifteen, considering



mitigating factors and aggravating factors. The aggravating factor being the high consumption of alcohol. I would not argue that it was an aggravating factor that Mr. James, years earlier, had a problem when he was younger and sought to remedy that and took actions on that. I would consider that a mitigating factor in the sense that he had done the same thing following this accident, may well have done the same thing if he had gotten home safely and realized he had consumed so much and this was going to be a problem. In fact, his history would show that. But unfortunately it didn't. It led to the death of another person and whether that person being a stranger or a loved one, the death is no less important or no less of an impact on him. And he acknowledges that.

As you've noticed in his PSI, the statements to the -- to Ms. Mooney, as well as the statement and the letter of his parents, he carries a reminder of Mr. Baumes every day to know what he cost him, what he did, and how he's responsible.

Since the date of his arraignment, he has had to check-in daily and blow to ensure he didn't drink again.

We've been -- since September 30th of -- approximately

September 30th/October of 2017, he has been sober and he's proven his sobriety. He has attended counseling with James Riley. He has taken a proactive look that a person taking responsibility and understanding the problem lays upon that.

And so we not only do not have a prior criminal record but since this incident we have clear evidence that he could abide by conditions and is committed to his sobriety and understands the gravity of what happened.

And so the question is, is what is the appropriate punishment here? We do not, as the Court acknowledges, sentence a person based upon the value of somebody else's life but of the crime itself and weighing all factors. Clearly, in a case like this, we're going to hear from and understand just how much was lost. And Mr. James, from reading the letters that were submitted, the PSI as well as the letters, and listening to testimony, has a clear appreciation of what his actions have cost others.

And now before the Court is what is to be done with Mr. James. The Court knows the history, and background, and life of Mr. James as I set out in my sentencing memo. The need for treatment, I believe still exists. He needs to continue counseling, not just to maintain sobriety, but to deal with the depression and grief that comes when you know that you -- someone's dead and it's your fault. Otherwise there is a risk to Mr. James and the community that Mr. James may choose I don't want to live anymore, I don't want to be productive anymore, I don't want to live anymore, I don't have anything to live for. These are the type of things in which one of the messages as part of punishment is, no, you have an

obligation to society, you have an obligation to yourself and you have an obligation to the family of that person to whom you've killed to give back to that society. And you cannot just run or hide from it. Mr. James is not doing that.

But in fashioning a sentence, Your Honor, I would ask that the important thing here really is the rehabilitation and retribution, what is to be demanded he give back. The benefit of a split sentence, aside from having a minimum and max hanging over him if he strays even by violating a condition such as going back to drinking or engaging in any type of reckless behavior, he's got that hanging over him. But he also has an indefinite period of probation. A five-year sentence means that at five years, judging he does not get in trouble or anything, he would come out. And five years from now, he'd just mark the time and then he'd be on parole, and after ten years or an initial five years, he would be under no supervision.

The Court, in a split, can determine when the Court decides he should no longer be under supervision. A year and a half is not, as Mr. Burke understands, is not a slap on the wrist. Mr. James has never spent a day in jail.

Incarceration is the most significant form of punishment we can give anybody in this state. And to a person who's never known jail, it can -- eighteen months is a very significant amount of jail sentence.



The other thing in considering this is in considering the need for continuing treatment, for continuing counseling or if there is to be a break, to make sure that break is not so large as to undermine attempts at counseling. In the PSI, Ms. Mooney points out that one thing that they would expect of him is that he do the risk reduction program. And there is programming inside as well as outside, but definitely inside. These type of programs are generally six, nine, twelve months at the most. I think actually about nine months. he's going to have dead time where all he's going to do is There isn't going to be any counseling or programming. The programming will be put in before he reaches his minimum, but not so much so that he just sits after he's completed his programming.

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So the eighteen months factors in not -- the reason we're not asking for the minimum is that we're asking for the minimum plus the time necessary for the programming. So we have both a year of pure, nothing but incarcerative punishment, followed by six months of risk reduction programming.

Then we have requirements that are very restrictive from the conditions of probation. I mean, that's -- probation itself is a punishment. It is a restriction on liberty. It is a restriction on who he associates, lives, curfew. All of the things that probation can impose is also a form of



punishment. And that punishment in a split can be indefinite.

It may not have an end time until the Court determines it has an end time.

A sentence of five years means four and a half years of strict dead time before he'd be eligible for any type of programming. And in considering Mr. James, his background, his history, what he's done before this night, and everything he's done after, that is a significant amount of punishment beyond what would be necessary as a deterrence. There is nothing provided by the PSI, by the State, or anybody that says Mr. James himself needs to be removed from society because Mr. James is a constant, continuing threat to others. That is an argument applied to those who are on their second, third, fourth DUI, or lead a criminal life or some life that shows that they have no respect for the welfare of others. Well, then we have to remove you for a significant time.

Mr. James clearly demonstrates he understands the deterrence. If there is deterrence here, it should be general. And by arguing and not asking for a full suspended -- by agreeing and arguing for this sentence, and I'm arguing for this sentence because I believe it is the most appropriate taking all things into consideration, it still sends a message to the community of if you get behind the wheel intoxicated and you take a person's life, you are going to go to jail, period. How long will depend on that case as



well. How much deterrence that applies to people who drink and they are not thinking? We don't know. We don't know how many people don't get behind the wheel because someone -- they read in the paper someone served a jail sentence from the fear they might go to jail. We just don't know those facts. But to the extent that deterrence should apply here, the Court should consider it more as general than as personal because Mr. James has demonstrated he understands what he did and what he needs to do to make sure something like that never happens again.

THE COURT: How should consequences be factored in?

MR. MONTGOMERY: The consequence of getting behind

the wheel and taking a person's life is twofold. He's going

to lose his freedom in a jail sentence for a year and a half.

That is not insignificant. Then he is going to be under a

period of supervision for a very long time. And he's going to

be at risk of so much as any deviation of serving a four- to

eight-year sentence. So a matter of consequence is how much

the Court determines that incarceration, that form of

punishment, should be a significant consequence based on the

fact that someone died here or -- I won't say significant, but

is four years that much of a consequence or eighteen months

when we're talking about incarceration itself.

And to acknowledge -- and I would argue to acknowledge that there's a certain point in which a person's



jailed where that punishment has diminishing marginal returns, that when a person who sits in jail for ninety days is terrified; a person who sits in jail for nine months begins to acclimate, but eighteen months is a long period of time for a person who's never sat in jail. And that's a serious consequence. It is by no means a slap on the wrist. That is a removal from society. And then when he returns back to society under strict, harsh conditions, they are also consequences as he knows and the Court has pointed out, he's got a felony on his record, he's got the type of felony that will deprive him of many potential opportunities in his life that he would've had had he not gotten behind the wheel and had so much to drink.

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And he can't argue that if only my friends had stopped me. If only the bar hadn't served me. Consequences must all lie upon him, but I can't think of any -- how many days in jail you could add that would be greater than the consequence of living the rest of his life knowing he took somebody else's. I mean, I'm -- it's hard to fathom a consequence greater than that guilt. And it's -- and the eighteen months I'm arguing is based solely upon the person and the mitigating circumstances that stands here before you, and that's why I'm asking for that sentence.

With regard to the conditions of probation, Mr. James would have no objection. The ones I would raise, Your Honor,



and if I could -- just bear with me. There's one that he's not to associate with people who may be reasonably suspected of consuming alcohol or drugs without a prescription. Ah, here we go. Condition 12, your probation officer may prohibit you from residing or associating with individuals reasonably suspected of consuming or selling illicit regulated substance abuses or alcohol.

I have an objection. That's over broad. That's vague and difficult to enforce, particularly with the term of reasonable. Is it reasonable to the probation officer or reasonable to Mr. James? How would that be reasonable? I would think more tailored would be that he not associate -- I'm not sure how you could possibly do that, but I would leave that to the Court, but I believe as it's written there, it's just too vague for him to understand when he's following it, if he's with somebody who might have a drinking problem that he might not know anything about.

I think the other restrictions that he's not -- I'm not sure if it's in here, not to go to places where the primary business is consumption of alcohol. That wouldn't -- if he were to allowed to return to Equinox, that's not their primary business and he doesn't even work in the areas involving service of alcohol. He works behind the desk.

Reasonable restrictions on location of your residence. I'm not sure how restricting a residence would



apply to the crime here and that's why I would object to that, is that where he lives does not seem to play any role in the crime here. And again, restrictions with those whom you associate is -- gives the officer the power for any reason without stating specifically why he should not be able to associate with anybody.

So aside from conditions 12, 25, and 26, Mr. James has no objection to the other conditions imposed and they're significant.

THE COURT: Mr. James? You have time to speak at this time if you wish.

(Pause)

THE COURT: If you -- it'll pick it up. You don't need to speak into the microphone.

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: Microphone.

THE DEFENDANT: I've turned over a thousand times in my head what I'd say today. A thousand times I've grappled with how to address this court, a way to explain or apologize for the loss of a son, a brother, the best man and the friend, a man I didn't know in life, but have since come to know by way of his impact on others. This is a man who I do carry a picture of every day because I find it important to look at his face because I know that this person was their everything.

And I would do anything to bring him back. And I've



completely -- if they need time for me, whatever the amount of time is, if that's all I can give this family, then I owe them at least that much and I'm -- you know, sorry and apologies are a hollow thing, but I do apologize for the impact that it's had on them. That's -- I --

MR. MONTGOMERY: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I'm going to take a break. Sentencing is clearly the most difficult thing that we do. There's no guide. There's no magic formula. There's nothing that you can say to plug in and say this is the answer because there is no answer and we're dealing with a tragic loss, an unfortunate tragic loss, but it's my responsibility to impose an appropriate sentence based on all the circumstances. The legislature has given us great leeway in determining what appropriate would be under these circumstances.

And there's some good things in Mr. James' way and there are very bad things in Mr. James' way and I'm going to weigh them all up and come back and give a sentence.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Recess at 3:44 p.m., until 3:53 p.m.)

THE COURT: We're back on the record on the State of Vermont v. Christian James who's pled guilty to one count of DUI with a .08 or more with a fatality caused by his actions of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under



the influence of alcohol.

I've been doing this job for twenty years and it never gets easier. It never gets clearer. It never becomes more defined as to what is appropriate, what's not appropriate of how to do this. And before that I was an attorney for almost twenty years doing similar types of cases, mostly in the civil cases with wrongful death actions, involving trying to value human life, which is something that I think is difficult under any circumstances, to put a value on a human life, because you never can, either on the civil side where someone could have a wrongful death action or on the criminal side where society has a claim against someone for doing what Mr. James did that night.

And then Mr. James has some good things going for him. He's taken responsibility for his actions. That's something that I think everyone looks at as a positive. He has no record. I'm not going to hold the fact that he went to rehabilitation in college against him in any way in imposing a sentence. He appears to be remorseful. It's very clear he appears to be remorseful. He's very clear in the statements that he gave in the plea and -- but you can't remove the human factor in any case.

And we have laws -- we have laws, we have rules, we have guides, we have all these different things, but in the end we're talking about human beings and we're talking about



consequences of human interaction. And to say that the law provides guide for this or law provides guide for that is in my mind is a fallacy because we're dealing with people and we're dealing with lives and we're dealing with tragic components of life, where everyone in this room, everyone in this room has felt the trauma of the unfortunate consequences of Mr. James' action that night. That means his family as well as the victim's family. And it's deep and it's strong and it's powerful and it's going to last for a long time. And how do you factor that into coming out with a necessary and appropriate sentence?

And on the bad side it was a 0.39 (sic) test which is extraordinarily high, for all judgment and all sense and all ability to control his actions on a -- his motor skills by being able to operate a motor vehicle are completely gone as well as control his judgment by behind -- the fact that he even got behind the wheel. And that deserves punishment clearly.

And the randomness and the needlessness of the death here, where an individual is driving down the road and I do factor in the pre-impact fear. I think that there's very clear that the pre-impact component in this case where the deceased sees the car in his lane, he slows down to the point where he's either not moving or going very slowly and that does factor in.



And so we look at all the different components of sentencing from specific deterrence, which I don't think is — I think the specific deterrence in Mr. James' situation is the fact that he's going to bear the brunt of a felony and that that unto itself is going to create some deterrence for him. But at some level, you need to have some general deterrence on people making uninformed, ill-advised, not from any, any reasonableness, getting behind the wheel of a car that causes the death of another human being. And that doesn't mean just — that means just anyone. I mean, anyone who has that type of test and they're — it's just a matter of time between — before either they're going to hurt themselves or hurt someone else.

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And so you look at the cases that would cause -- what you say would be at the low end, if there is a such a thing as the low end on a fatality, and I'm not so sure there is, somebody with a low test, somebody who gets in the car with someone who they know is intoxicated, someone who does -- who's gone through their whole life without anything -- I'm not sure how you ever do a low end on this.

But this case deserves appropriate punishment and deserves appropriate general deterrence for people in the community. And I have a responsibility to the community. I have a responsibility to the State of Vermont to ensure that people who put themselves in the same situation that Mr. James



did that night think more critically about how their actions are and how their actions are perceived and the consequences of their actions. This is not a case that deserves a split sentence. It's not a case that deserves eighteen months in prison. I'm thinking more at the top end, the high end, of the case where it would be. Legislature did not divide it down into saying that if it's a multiple offense that there would be a sentence of ten years to fifteen years or something. I'm factoring in the death of a human being. factoring it high as the consequences of the death as outlined by everything I've read and everything I've heard. So on the short end of the -- on the low end it's going to be a four-year sentence to serve and on the high end,

eight years. And what's the State's request on reporting?

MR. BURKE: Immediately, Your Honor. And I believe Mr. Montgomery has prepared his client for that.

MR. MONTGOMERY: That's correct, Your Honor. ready to report today.

THE COURT: Today?

MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. He'll go into custody. Thank you.

> THE CLERK: All rise.

(Proceedings concluded at 3:59 PM)

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I, Pessy Kaufman, the court-approved transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

PESSY KAUFMAN

February 4, 2019

DATE

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